How should an understanding of gender shape our approach to the production of knowledge? by Dunn, Alice R.
Journal of International Women's Studies 
Volume 22 
Issue 2 The Post Pandemic University, 
Possibilities, Practices and Pedagogies: And 
New Writings in Feminist and Women’s 
Studies—Winning and Short-listed Entries from 
the 2020 Feminist Studies Association’s (FSA) 
Annual Student Essay Competition 
Article 9 
March 2021 
How should an understanding of gender shape our approach to 
the production of knowledge? 
Alice R. Dunn 
University of York 
Follow this and additional works at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws 
 Part of the Women's Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Dunn, Alice R. (2021). How should an understanding of gender shape our approach to the production of 
knowledge?. Journal of International Women's Studies, 22(2), 92-102. 
Available at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/jiws/vol22/iss2/9 
This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State 
University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. 
This journal and its contents may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or 
systematic reproduction, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form 
to anyone is expressly forbidden. ©2021 Journal of International Women’s Studies. 
92 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No. 2 March 2021 
 
 
How should an understanding of gender shape our approach to the production of 
knowledge? 
 




For feminists, the question of what it means to take a feminist approach to the knowledge 
production process itself is of paramount importance. Drawing on postcolonial and intersectional 
thought and embedded in a discussion of the realities of the academic research process, this paper 
questions how an understanding of gender should shape such an approach. Ultimately, it argues 
the importance of moving beyond self-reflexivity alone and towards an understanding of research 
as a process of representation. 
Starting from the intuition that feminist normative theorising should be grounded in 
women’s experiences, I first consider how the starting point and end point of feminist theory are 
intrinsically linked and always embedded within the contextual realities of academic research. 
Using feminist approaches to development as a springboard, I then examine how an intersectional 
understanding of gender should shape the feminist production of knowledge. I then argue for the 
importance of self-reflexivity for feminists seeking to ground their work in women’s conditions 
and experiences, while also challenging the ways in which it can lead to a reinforcing of existing 
unjust structures of power. Finally, drawing on Spivak’s exploration of the concept of 
representation and Alcoff’s analysis of the problems of speaking for others, I show that the concept 
of representation offers an alternative path for the feminist production of knowledge. 
 





A hallmark of feminist political theory, despite its incredible diversity, is a focus on gender. 
Reflecting feminism’s roots as an activist and not an academic movement, it also has at its core a 
desire to achieve “women’s substantive equality” (Schwartzmann 2006: 165). What ‘women’ – or 
‘gender’ – means is certainly not a settled question for feminist political theorists. There exists, 
therefore, no single ‘understanding of gender’ that ought to shape our approach to the production 
of knowledge, but rather, a multitude of understandings. This essay will focus in particular on the 
question of whether an understanding of gender in this context means that “women’s particular 
experiences and the ways in which they address their conditions… [should] represent the 
ineluctable starting point of (feminist) normative theorising2” (Nuti 2016: 291). Drawing on both 
 
1 Alice Roberts Dunn is currently an MA candidate in Social Research at the University of York. She will be 
commencing a PhD in Politics at York in Autumn 2021, as part of an ESRC 1+3 studentship. She also recently 
graduated from the MPhil in Multi-disciplinary Gender Studies at the University of Cambridge. Her research is in 
feminist political theory, with particular focus on the representation of women, democracy, and group voting 
behaviour. 
2 Taken as synonymous with “feminist political theory”. 
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intersectionality and postcolonial understandings of gender it will question what it means to speak 
for and construct representations of others, and how this should be navigated in the knowledge 
production process in the context of academic feminist political theory research. In order to 
illuminate this debate, this essay will draw on the example of feminist approaches to development, 
considering the two influential feminist approaches “Women in Development” (WID) and 
“Gender and Development” (GAD) as a springboard to discussing wider questions of feminist 
methodology. After considering what the goal (or endpoint) of feminist political theory ought to 
be, it will argue that women’s actual conditions and experiences should form the starting point of 
the production of knowledge, as a prelude to examining gendered structures of power through the 
use of gender as a category of analysis; properly utilised, these two approaches are complementary 
rather than contradictory. It will also argue that an intersectional approach to who is a ‘woman’, 
and what experiences ‘count’, is necessary. By considering feminist approaches to development 
in the light of postcolonial theory, it will also highlight the importance of a critical view of one’s3 
own position as a researcher in representing the experiences of the women at whose experiences 
the research begins, the absence of which can lead to incorrect assertions of universality or to a 
failure to critically examine structures of power that intersect with gender. Drawing particularly 
on Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s exploration of the concept of representation (1988), and Linda 
Alcoff’s analysis of and recommendations on The Problem of Speaking for Others (1991) this 
essay will argue that, as well as self-reflexivity, a critical eye to the representation of the subjects 
of one’s research in the production of knowledge is key. 
 
 
Women’s experiences and feminist goals 
Before it is possible to consider how an understanding of gender should shape one’s 
approach to the production of knowledge, it is necessary to spend some time considering the goal, 
or endpoint, of this process in the context of feminist political theory. The question of how the 
production of knowledge should be shaped is a normative one, and therefore requires a sense of 
what such an approach ought to be working towards. When considering the production of 
knowledge in the context of the university, there are of course particular material pressures that 
will inevitably have a large influence. As a student, competition between classmates, pressure to 
achieve high grades, and the arduous process of securing funding will all form the ultimate goal 
of research conducted, however unsatisfactory this reality might be to a developing feminist 
scholar. Even once a PhD has been completed, for the scholar who chooses to stay in a university 
setting, the pressures of ensuring job security in a ‘publish or perish’ culture (McGrail, Rickard 
and Jones 2006) pervade the research process. These material pressures will inescapably form, in 
some sense, the goal of research, for students and postdoctoral scholars alike. Indeed, it cannot go 
unspoken that this essay itself would not exist if not for these multiple pressures. Examining the 
implications of this in depth falls beyond the scope of this essay, but they are too important not to 
note. 
Nevertheless, feminist political theory is unlikely to have been chosen as a field because 
of the promise of great power or unlimited funds. Instead, feminism “offers an analysis that is not 
“neutral” or “abstract,” but that instead aims for a particular social ideal, women’s substantive 
equality” (Schwartzmann 2006: 165). In keeping with feminism’s activist roots, the ultimate goal 
 
3 While the question refers to “our” approach to the production of knowledge, “one” is used as a pronoun throughout 
the essay. This is a deliberate choice which does not implicate the reader or others in the problematic approaches 
discussed, in recognition of the diverse range of backgrounds in and approaches to feminist political theory. 
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of academic feminist political theory is to achieve – in some sense – equality for women, or the 
liberation of women from oppressive structures of gender, race, dis/ability, sexuality, and other 
such dimensions. Exactly what this means, or how this should be carried out, is the subject of 
intense debate within the movement which this essay unfortunately lacks the space to consider in 
depth, but in lieu of such a discussion it will take ‘gender equality’ as the general goal of feminist 
political theory. In this sense, the starting point of feminist normative theory is the same as the 
endpoint; a desire to work towards gender equality ultimately informs the production of 
knowledge: what questions are being asked, why, and how research is going to be carried out. 
Having considered the ultimate goal and foundational starting point of the production of 
knowledge in feminist normative theorising, we can begin to consider what research with this goal 
in mind should look like in practice. Returning to the central debate of the essay, we will now 
consider whether women’s actual conditions, and/or women’s experiences, should form the 
starting point of the production of knowledge ‘in the field’, and how an understanding of gender 
should shape our approach to the production of knowledge. Returning to the quote that begins this 
essay, Nuti argues that: 
 
“[A] methodological premise of feminist normative theorising is that theory should 
be grounded in women’s actual conditions. Women’s particular experiences and 
the ways in which they address their conditions are not simply an important source 
of knowledge; they represent the ineluctable starting point of (feminist) normative 
theorising.” (2016: 291). 
 
For Nuti, such an approach is necessary because starting from women’s idealised circumstances 
and ‘working back’ “is likely to neglect the actual experience of many women, and miss whether 
and how the dimensions of gender inequality it has abstracted from affect the position of women” 
(2016: 292). Such an approach shares some similarities with “standpoint feminism”, which aims 
to “[locate], in a material and political disadvantage or form of oppression, a distinctive insight 
about how a hierarchical social structure works” (Harding 2004: 31). As well as echoing the utility 
of the specific standpoint of the researcher (Hartsock 1983), such an approach begins with the 
experiences of other women, incorporating both those women’s unique insights and particular 
view of the world (or standpoint), and the researcher’s. 
A distinction must at this point be drawn between women’s actual conditions and women’s 
experiences. While women’s actual conditions could be ascertained by the researcher without 
reference to the subjectivity of the women whose conditions they are – though this approach would 
be very much limiting – to speak of women’s experiences makes central the way the women 
involved have interpreted and felt those conditions to have impacted their lives. Taking women’s 
actual conditions as the starting point of the production of knowledge in this sense is essential 
because it highlights the problems in the lives of women – the gap between their current lives and 
a life of substantive gender equality – and therefore guides feminist normative theorising for which 
this goal is intrinsically linked (Nuti 2016). Women’s experiences are critical because they 
highlight how those conditions are actually understood, enabling the researcher to focus her 
attention on those areas which her work could prove most useful in changing. 
Starting the production of knowledge from women’s actual conditions and experiences, in 
the context of feminist normative theorising, is an essential method for guiding the attention of 
feminist political theorists. There are, however, a number of considerations with such an approach 
that examining different understandings of gender can illuminate, namely: how should the 
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researcher decide who the women are, and what aspects of their conditions or experiences should 
she pay attention to? How does the researcher herself play into the knowledge production process? 
And what ramifications arise from representing women’s experiences, particularly in the context 
of unequal global power relations? To consider how these problems might influence an approach 
to feminist normative theorising which begins from women’s experiences, we will now examine 
the example of feminist approaches to development in the context of “Women in Development”, 
as contrasted with the later “Gender and Development” approach. 
 
 
Contrasting “Women in Development” and “Gender and Development” 
The birth of sustained western feminist interventions in development can be marked by the 
publication of Ester Boserup’s seminal work Woman’s Role in Economic Development (1970). 
With this work, Boserup drew attention to the failure of contemporary development programmes 
in Africa to include women in their allocation of resources to farmers, despite the fact that women 
constituted the majority of farmers in these areas. Boserup’s work also marked the beginning of 
what would become known as the “Women in Development” (WID) movement, which “struggled 
to make women’s labor and expertise visible to the architects of development programs, so as to 
extend the benefits of modernization to women as well as to men” (Chowdhury 2016: 141). The 
problem, as identified by WID, was that women were being excluded from development – both in 
practical terms relating to the allocation of resources, and (as Boserup demonstrated) in terms of 
the research being carried out on development as a practice. As a response to this exclusion, WID 
scholars both critiqued existing scholarship in the field of development, which was systematically 
excluding women, and conducted their own research which centred on women, rather than men 
(Boserup 1970, Tinker and Cohen 1985).  
One of the key sites of tension between WID and the later approach, “Gender and 
Development” (GAD), was the contention that WID problematised women themselves, rather than 
the structures that influence and constrain their lives. While WID did broadly take as its starting 
point women’s actual living conditions – reacting against the contemporary dominant approach 
which caused them to be “Rendered economically invisible” (Tinker and Cohen 1985: 83), a lack 
of examination of the broader structures of gender relations which influence the lives of women in 
the Global South, as well as the treatment of people in the area of study as an ‘Other’, are 
drawbacks in the WID approach which GAD sought to highlight (and to rectify). Where WID had 
“left “development” itself largely unproblematized” (Chowdhury 2016: 144), GAD sought both to 
question the goals and practices of development itself and to shift the focus of critique away from 
women and towards structures. 
Many of the problems of the WID approach also reflect the critical difference between 
women’s experiences and women’s actual conditions. Where taking women’s experiences as a 
starting point requires the researcher to give space to the way women encounter and work around 
the position in which they find themselves, WID tended to ignore this subjectivity in favour of 
privileging the researcher’s own assessment of those conditions, and how women might thus be 
incorporated into (primarily economic) development efforts. The lack of structural approach is a 
characteristic difference between Women in Development and the later Gender and Development, 
with ‘gender’ instead of ‘women’ standing in for a more structural analysis. This development 
highlights a potential issue with starting from women’s actual conditions and experiences – that it 
might lead to a lack of examination of the structural way in which gender, and other dimensions 
of inequality, operate in women’s lives.  
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Taking an intersectional approach 
The inevitable question that follows from a decision to begin the production of knowledge 
from the place of women’s experiences, and the necessary next step of considering gendered 
structures of power, is: Who are (the) women here? While considering how one might neatly 
categorise “women” or “gender” – if indeed it is possible to do so at all – falls beyond the scope 
of this short essay, it is nonetheless critical to discuss how women ought not to be categorised in 
order to examine what “an understanding of gender” should mean in the context of the production 
of knowledge.  
A drawback that might be present in feminist normative theorising, highlighted by the WID 
approach, is a conception of women that is essentialist or lacks intersectionality. Particularly 
present in many feminist theories of development and compounded by imperialist attitudes 
towards women in the Global South, this conceptual homogeneity is an unavoidable result of 
leaving other vectors of oppression unchallenged or unanalysed, and envisions women as white, 
wealthy, cis/het, able-bodied (and, outside of the development context, resident in the Global 
North). In other words, to claim to focus on gender alone (even if this were to be possible) means 
in actuality to focus only on women for whom gender is their sole vector of oppression, and not 
the vast majority of women for whom gender is one intersecting such vector (Crenshaw 1989, 
1991; Collins and Bilge 2016). Chandra Mohanty draws attention to the problems of such a 
homogenising approach in the context of feminist approaches to development with the example of 
women in Egypt, describing how “The interests of urban, middle-class Egyptian housewives… 
could surely not be seen as being the same as those of their uneducated, poor maids” (1988: 72). 
Such a misrepresentation in this case is based on the use of “women” as a “stable category of 
analysis [which] assumes an ahistorical, universal unity among women based on a generalized 
notion of their subordination” (ibid.): in the WID approach, “social relations and multiple, complex 
identities, which lie at the basis of persisting inequalities, are seldom taken into account” (Bastia 
2014: 237). Without an intersectional consideration, “women” becomes as it was in WID 
approaches a “prediscursive and deterministic” category (Chowdhury 2016: 160), wherein women 
in development contexts are conceived of as a sort of homogenous and problematised ‘Other’ 
(Mohanty 1991), without explicit consideration of the different structures that could be 
constraining their choices (Tinker and Cohen 1985). 
As Kimberlé Crenshaw highlights, “[a] focus on the most privileged group members 
marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as 
resulting from discrete sources of discrimination” (Crenshaw 1989: 140). Crenshaw’s account is 
situated in the exclusion of black women in the United States from both the feminist and anti-racist 
movements, and “[her] focus on the intersections of race and gender only highlights the need to 
account for multiple grounds of identity when considering how the social world is constructed.” 
(Crenshaw 1991: 1245). Accounting for multiple grounds of identity both in feminist approaches 
to development and feminist normative theorising more broadly is therefore crucial because “it is 
only by understanding the contradictions inherent in women’s location within various structures 
that effective political action and challenges can be devised” (Mohanty 1988: 74). In other words, 
substantive gender equality can only be achieved for women who experience other vectors of 
oppression by also analysing and tackling those other vectors in feminist political theory, through 
structural focus. As such, when considering whose conditions and experiences should form the 
starting point of the production of knowledge, it is critical to consider both multiply-burdened 
women and to recognise those experiences which arise from such intersections as experiences 
which must inform the questions that are being asked and the structures considered. 
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Failing to take an intersectional approach to the conception of “women” when starting from 
women’s experiences and women’s actual conditions forms a crucial mistake in the production of 
knowledge in feminist political theory. If one is working from and towards the goal of ‘substantive 
gender equality’, it is essential that the understanding of gender and of “women” that influences 
this process is an intersectional one. 
 
 
Speech and self-reflexivity 
We have considered how one ought (not) to conceptualise women when beginning one’s 
research from women’s experiences, particularly in the context of feminist normative theory of 
development. But an understanding of gender must also entail an understanding of both what it 
means to consider women as a group at all, and to be incorporating (other) women’s experiences 
into one’s research. This requirement is once again particularly acute in the context of feminist 
development scholarship: given that feminist development scholars mostly take as their focus of 
knowledge production women in the Global South, it is inescapable that “working in 
development... positions us within a ‘development discourse’, where the North’s superiority over 
the South is taken for granted, and Western-style development is the norm” (Kapoor 2004: 629). 
The impact of this dynamic is a significant risk of silencing the women whose actual conditions 
have been taken as the grounds of the research, and whose experiences are forming the starting 
point of the production of knowledge. 
Spivak notes the need for self-reflexivity on the part of the researcher, arguing that 
feminists must go further than to decentre Western notions of womanhood but should also “learn 
to stop feeling privileged as a woman” (1981: 157). Not only does this mean it is necessary to take 
an intersectional approach to the production of knowledge, but it also requires a critical analysis 
not only of one’s own position as a woman in relation to the subject of one’s research, but also of 
one’s conception of the women whose experiences are being taken as a starting point of the 
production of knowledge: “not merely who am I? but who is the other woman? How am I naming 
her? How does she name me? Is this part of the problematic I discuss?” (Spivak 1981: 179). A 
critical consideration of one’s own positionality is necessary because it can highlight incorrect 
assertions of universality or gender essentialism, which might seem to be natural or intrinsic to the 
researcher but in fact is an artefact of her specific geographical, social, and temporal location – she 
is not “seeing everything from nowhere” (Haraway 1988: 581). It also requires the researcher to 
consider her place in the global structures of power that disadvantage women in the Global South, 
and to guard against potential complicity in those structures. Alternatively, where she shares them 
with the women whose experiences form the starting point of the production of knowledge, a 
researcher’s own experiences can prove beneficial in helping to illuminate both the questions that 
should be asked in her work, and the structures which she should be analysing – both gendered 
and otherwise. 
An acknowledgement of one’s own positionality (either explicitly in whatever research 
piece one is writing, or implicitly as an unwritten part of the production of knowledge) is therefore 
useful but, as Spivak notes, not enough alone: “Outside (though not completely so) the circuit of 
the international division of labor, there are people whose consciousness we cannot grasp if we 
close off our benevolence by constructing a homogenous Other referring only to our own place in 
the seat of the Same or the Self” (1988: 288). It is simply not sufficient to consider one’s own 
position if one then constructs the subject of one’s research out of all those spaces that remain 
unfilled. Further, limiting the consideration of one’s positionality in the production of knowledge 
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to a ‘disclaimer’ outlining the researcher’s position “leaves for the listeners [or readers] all the real 
work that needs to be done” (Alcoff 1991: 25), specifically in working out the potential gaps or 
incorrect assertions in the research. Far from engaging with the voice of the marginalised listener, 
such an act merely transfers to them the academic labour that the feminist political theorist 
themselves should be doing, only reinforcing the oppressive global power structures that – in 
seeking the goal of intersectionally-envisioned substantive gender equality – feminist political 
theorists should be working to undermine. 
The response of some scholars in feminist political theory to these problems is to decide to 
only speak for themselves: as Trebilcot explains, “an account I give reports only my understanding 
of the world” (1988: 3-4). In this way, such theorists seek to avoid appearing to ‘speak for’ others, 
and so inadvertently silencing them. The idea that speaking only for one’s self is how an 
understanding of gender (particularly an understanding that it is fundamentally heterogenous) 
ought to characterise one’s approach to producing knowledge, rests on the assumption that to only 
speak for oneself is a sort of default or neutral act. This assumption is incorrect in two senses.  
Firstly, speech in the academic or university context is usually a relational and a productive 
act: there is a speaker or a writer and, the researcher hopes, one or more listeners or readers. What 
one says has an impact on the person listening in a very real sense, as “We are collectively caught 
in an intricate, delicate web in which each action I take, discursive or otherwise, pulls on, breaks 
off, or maintains the tension in many strands of a web in which others find themselves moving 
also.” (Alcoff 1991: 21). Alcoff illustrates this point with the example of a group of sexual abuse 
survivors recounting their experiences, arguing that a survivor characterising her abuse as “sex 
play”, true though it may be to her own understanding of what happened to her, might “profoundly 
harm” (ibid.) someone for whom this resonates more with their abuser’s characterisation of how 
he envisions the abuse. So even speaking for oneself can be harmful, in the sense that it is not only 
representative but creative, with the potential to both reinscribe unequal power relations and to 
exclude other women and their experiences. As Alcoff powerfully argues – “the declaration that I 
"speak only for myself" has the sole effect of allowing me to avoid responsibility and 
accountability for my effects on others; it cannot literally erase those effects” (1991: 20). 
Secondly, claiming to speak only for one’s self can be problematic because it constitutes a 
political act, just as it seeks to avoid being one. On this basis, Spivak explicitly criticises using 
postcolonial theory to excuse a failure to engage with postcolonial contexts at all – to say ““O.K, 
sorry, we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks.” That’s the 
kind of breast-beating that is left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual.” 
(Spivak 1990:121, in Kapoor 2008: 45). Alcoff provides a useful anecdote which illuminates this 
problem: 
At a recent symposium at my university, a prestigious theorist was invited to give 
a lecture on the political problems of postmodernism. Those of us in the audience, 
including many white women and people of oppressed nationalities and races, 
waited in eager anticipation for what he has to contribute to this important 
discussion. To our disappointment, he introduced his lecture by explaining that he 
could not cover the assigned topic, because as a white male he did not feel that he 
could speak for the feminist and postcolonial perspectives that have launched the 
critical interrogation of postmodernism’s politics. He went on to give us a lecture 
on architecture. (Alcoff 1991: 5-6) 
 
99 
Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 22, No.2 March 2021 
In this case, the effect of the failure of the theorist to speak, on the basis that he could not speak 
for others, “was that he offered no contribution to an important issue and all of us there lost an 
opportunity to discuss and explore it” (Alcoff 1991: 27). Thus, failing to speak can foreclose debate 
and discussion of critical issues. It can have much more harmful consequences outside the 
academic setting too, contributing to the concealment of injustice, violence, and exploitative 
structures of power where those issues as a consequence become unmentioned. If a scholar has a 
privileged position in terms of generating and sharing knowledge – if she is likely to be listened to 




Representation, development, and postcolonial theory 
Given the problems of speaking and the potential to silence those whose experiences and 
actual conditions form the foundation of one’s research, it is essential to consider how one can 
take those experiences and conditions as a starting point without engaging in such silencing. It is 
an active engagement with the problems of representation which provides the key (Alcoff 1991), 
in other words, “to ask who represents, and what baggage positions us in this us/them manner” 
(Kapoor 2008: 43). In her seminal work “Can the subaltern speak?” (1988), Spivak uses the 
example of sati, “the practice, [previously] prevalent predominantly among high caste Hindus, of 
the immolation of widows on the funeral pyres of their husband” (Mani 1986: WS32), to illustrate 
that representation is not a neutral act, but demands self-reflexivity from the researcher or 
representative – including and beyond the situatedness of their knowledge to what impact their 
speech has. The claim of the British Government in this case to really know the Hindu widow 
“end[s] up silencing her, [and] also erases the role the British play in staging her representation” 
(Kapoor 2008: 42). Drawing on Marx, Spivak considers the multiple meanings of the word 
representation, which in the English language has many meanings ascribed to it. In German, 
however the word representation can be translated variously as vertreten and as dartelling. The 
former “implies a total understanding of the subject being “represented.” It is almost as if the 
representative has the total “agency” of the subject—a complete “filling in.” (Maggio 2007: 422). 
In contrast, dartelling carries different connotations, of “constituting” (ibid.) or “re-presenting” 
(Spivak 1988: 70) – reflecting Pitkin’s conception of political representation in a democratic 
context as a type of “making present again” (Pitkin 1967: 8). In a sense, the latter form of 
representation constitutes a form of embodiment of the represented ‘Other’. By conflating the two 
ideas of representation, the subaltern is silenced, “they are both being “stood in for” and 
“embodied” by others in the dominant discourse” (Maggio 2007: 422) and no space is left by the 
researcher for the subaltern to present themselves.  
Using women’s actual conditions and experiences as the starting point for the production 
of knowledge entails the researcher constructing herself a representation of those experiences, 
which leaves its imprints somewhere in the knowledge produced – either explicitly, or implicitly. 
Spivak does not consider that feminist scholars should reject the production of knowledge 
altogether on this basis, arguing instead that we ought to “become vigilant about our own practice 
and use it as much as we can rather than make the totally counter-productive gesture of repudiating 
it.” (1990: 11). Constructing representations carries a responsibility not to speak over the women 
whose experiences are forming the starting point for the process of the production of knowledge. 
The knowledge produced will inevitably in some sense re-present those experiences and 
conditions, so a researcher must be sure to utilise a privileged position to amplify the voices and 
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concerns of the women with whom she engages and represent faithfully, rather than constructing 
representations that do not reflect women’s experiences (as they see them). In this sense, the 
researcher re-presents the actual conditions and experiences of women, but does not seek to 
embody them, standing with rather than standing in for. The more unequal the power dynamic 
between the researcher and the women whose experiences she is taking as a starting point, the 
more attention must be paid to the representation produced, so as to challenge rather than reinforce 
that inequality. What is essential is that the researcher is mindful about “where the speech goes 
and what it does there” (Alcoff 1991: 26), ensuring that the knowledge she produces creates space 
for and amplifies women’s voices and experiences. She must also ensure the research is in some 
sense working towards the ultimate goal of feminist political theory – substantive gender equality 
– highlighting and challenging the structures which constrain the lives and choices of those whose 




By beginning with a comparison of WID and GAD, this essay has considered the potential 
benefits and pitfalls of taking the actual conditions and experiences of women as a starting point 
for the production of knowledge in the context of feminist political theory. For an understanding 
of gender to shape the production of knowledge by simply starting the process from women’s 
actual conditions, without questioning what that means, is not enough. But having a conception of 
women’s experiences which reflects the huge diversity within that category and centres women’s 
experiences of the intersection between gender and other dimensions of oppression, facilitates 
better feminist normative theorising. Also necessary is a critical consideration of the researcher’s 
own positionality and how it might affect both her representation of those experiences she takes 
as her starting point and being aware not to construct those women as ‘Other’ (Mohanty 1991). By 
also incorporating a postcolonial approach, the research should be shaped through the pursuit of 
representation as re-presentation rather than embodiment. An understanding of gender along these 
lines should be what shapes the production of knowledge in feminist normative theorising. 
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